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[Cite as Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 378 n.5 (1958). NOTE: This decision concerns a Teamster union member granted immunity from prosecution for testifying in a state court. The union member refused to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds that he was not immunized against federal prosecution. He was held in contempt because the Fifth Amendment applied only to federal court and not the states. The Supreme Court agreed. In a footnote, the Court observed that "[b]y 1900 the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the States had been rejected in cases involving claims based on virtually every provision of the first Articles of Amendment." The Court provided a lengthy list of these claims and included Cruikshank for "assemble and petition the government" and "right to keep and bear arms." (P. 378 n.5) This indicates the Court in 1957 felt the claim of injury in Cruikshank, which was unrelated to the militia, was a indeed a claim "based on [a] provision in the first eight Articles of Amendment" thereby believing it was applicable in that case of purely individual exercise (notwithstanding the federal government's lack of authority to enforce protections).]
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.
No. 189. Argued March 6, 10, 1958.--Decided June 30, 1958.
Subpoenaed before a state grand jury which was conducting an inquiry regarding violations of state laws, petitioner refused to answer certain questions on the ground of possible self-incrimination. After being granted under a state statute immunity from state prosecution and being ordered by a state court to answer, petitioner persisted in his refusal, on the ground that to answer the questions might expose him to federal prosecution for violation of a federal statute. For such refusal, he was convicted in the state court of contempt and sentenced to fine and imprisonment. Held: His conviction did not violate his rights under the Fifth Amendment, which limits only the powers of the Federal Government and not those of the States. Pp. 372-381.
(a) To sustain petitioner's contention that, because Congress has made certain conduct a federal crime, the Fifth Amendment enables him to assert against a State Government the privilege against giving testimony that might tend to implicate him in a violation of the federal statute, would disregard the historic distribution of power in our federal system between the Federal Government and the States. Pp. 374-377.
(b) Though the Fourteenth Amendment did impose some restrictions upon the States in the making and enforcement of criminal laws, it did not fundamentally change the great division of powers between the Federal Government and the States in the enforcement of the criminal law. P. 378.
(c) The right of the States, as a means of investigating and discovering corruption and misconduct which violate state laws, to require full disclosure in exchange for immunity of a witness from state prosecution cannot be denied on the ground that it may expose the witness to prosecution under federal law. Pp. 378-379.
(d) The sole purpose of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is the security of the individual against exertion of the power of the Federal Government to compel incriminating testimony with a view to enabling the Federal Government to convict him out of his own mouth. Pp. 379-380.
2 N.Y. 2d 913, 975, 141 N.E. 2d 825, 142 N.E. 2d 649, affirmed.(p.372)
Bernard H. Fitzpatrick argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was William J. Keating.
Richard G. Denzer argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Frank S. Hogan, Charles W. Manning, H. Richard Uviller and Harold Birns.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner is a partner in a New York manufacturing firm engaged in interstate commerce, some of whose employees have been organized by a local union of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Petitioner was subpoenaed to appear before a New York grand jury conducting an inquiry regarding bribery of labor representatives, conspiracy and extortion, constituting crimes under state law. Petitioner, duly sworn, was asked a question concerning the union's representation in certain wage negotiations with petitioner's firm; he refused to answer on the ground that his answer might tend to incriminate him. The grand jury then granted petitioner immunity from prosecution, applying N. Y. Penal Law, §§ 381, 2447, which provides that one duly granted immunity
"shall not be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which, in accordance with the order by competent authority, he gave answer or produced evidence, and that no such answer given or evidence produced shall be received against him upon any criminal proceeding." § 2447 (2).
Having been thus granted immunity, petitioner was directed to answer the question. He again refused to do so on the ground of possible self-incrimination.
In a subsequent appearance before the grand jury, petitioner was asked, and was directed to answer by the foreman, fourteen other questions concerning relations (p.373)and transactions between petitioner and union officials. Petitioner again invoked the privilege against self-incrimination. On application of the foreman of the grand jury, respondent Schweitzer, as judge of a New York Court of General Sessions, ordered petitioner to return to the grand jury and make answer to the questions put to him.
After further refusal to answer, petitioner was once more ordered to appear before respondent Schweitzer; when he did so, the respondent district attorney moved that petitioner be punished for contempt of court. In opposition to this application petitioner stood on his refusal to answer inasmuch as the immunity granted by the grand jury did not protect him against federal prosecution. Respondent Schweitzer adjudged petitioner in contempt of court and sentenced him to serve thirty days in jail and to pay a fine of $250. 4 Misc. 2d 449, 157 N.Y.S. 2d 820.
Petitioner applied to the Supreme Court of New York for reversal of the contempt conviction and for an order prohibiting respondents from proceeding further in the matter. He alleged that his danger of self-incrimination was attributable to the prosecutorial potentialities of § 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 157, 29 U.S.C. § 186, making it unlawful
"for any employer to pay or deliver, or to agree to pay or deliver, any money or other thing of value to any representative of any of his employees who are employed in an industry affecting commerce" (§ 302 (a)),
and to the fact that the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York had "made public announcement of his intention to cooperate with the [respondent] District Attorney ... in the prosecution of criminal cases in the field of the subject matter out of which petitioner's commitment arose." The petition for (p.374)reversal of the contempt conviction was denied by the Supreme Court; this judgment was unanimously affirmed in the Appellate Division, 2 App. Div. 2d 579, 157 N.Y.S. 2d 158, and, without opinion, by the Court of Appeals of New York, 2 N.Y. 2d 913, 141 N.E. 2d 825, which duly amended its remittitur to show that it had passed on and rejected petitioner's claim of a privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, 2 N.Y. 2d 975, 142 N.E. 2d 649. We granted certiorari, 355 U.S. 804, to consider this constitutional question.
Petitioner does not claim that his conviction of contempt for refusal to answer questions put to him in a state proceeding deprived him of liberty or property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; that such a claim is without merit was settled in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78. His contention is, rather, that, because the Congress of the United States has in the exercise of its constitutional powers made certain conduct unlawful, the Fifth Amendment gives him the privilege, which he can assert against either a State or the National Government, against giving testimony that might tend to implicate him in a violation of the federal Act.[374.1] Because of the momentum of adjudication whereby doctrine expands from case to case, such a claim carries dangerous implications. It may well lead to the contention that when Congress enacts a statute carrying criminal sanctions it has as a practical matter withdrawn from the States their traditional power to investigate in aid of prosecuting conventional state (p.375)crimes, some facts of which may be entangled in a federal offense. To recognize such a claim would disregard the historic distribution of power as between Nation and States in our federal system.
The essence of a constitutionally formulated federalism is the division of political and legal powers between two systems of government constituting a single Nation. The crucial difference between federalisms is in a wide sweep of powers conferred upon the central government with a reservation of specific powers to the constituent units as against a particularization of powers granted to the federal government with the vast range of governmental powers left to the constituent units. The difference is strikingly illustrated by the British North America Act, 1867, 30 Vict., c. 3, and the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 12. It is relevant to remind that our Constitution is one of particular powers given to the National Government with the powers not so delegated reserved to the States or, in the case of limitations upon both governments, to the people. Except insofar as penal remedies may be provided by Congress under the explicit authority to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" the other powers granted by Art. I, § 8, the bulk of authority to legislate on what may be compendiously described as criminal justice, which in other nations belongs to the central government, is under our system the responsibility of the individual States.
The choice of this form of federal arrangement was the product of a jealous concern lest federal power encroach upon the proper domain of the States and upon the rights of the people. It was the same jealous concern that led to the restrictions on the National Government expressed by the first ten amendments, colloquially known as the Bill of Rights. These provisions are deeply concerned with procedural safeguards pertaining to criminal (p.376)justice within the restricted area of federal jurisdiction. They are not restrictions upon the vast domain of the criminal law that belongs exclusively to the States.[376.2] Needless to say, no statesman of his day cared more for safeguarding the liberties that were enshrined in the Bill of Rights than did James Madison. But it was his view that these liberties were already protected against federal action by the Constitution itself. "My own opinion," he wrote to Thomas Jefferson, "has always been in favor of a bill of rights; provided it be so framed as not to imply powers not meant to be included in the enumeration. At the same time I have never thought the omission a material defect, nor been anxious to supply it even by subsequent amendment, for any other reason than that it is anxiously desired by others. I have favored it because I supposed it might be of use, and if properly (p.377)executed could not be of disservice. I have not viewed it in an important light 1. Because I conceive that in a certain degree, though not in the extent argued by Mr. Wilson, the rights in question are reserved by the manner in which the federal powers are granted...."[377.3] Plainly enough the limitations arising from the manner in which the federal powers were granted were limitations on the Federal Government, not on the States. The Bill of Rights that Madison sponsored because others anxiously desired that these limitations be made explicit patently was likewise limited to the Federal Government. If conclusive proof of this were needed, it is afforded by the fact that when Madison came to sponsor the Bill of Rights in the House of Representatives as safeguards against the Federal Government he proposed that like safeguards against the States be placed in the United States Constitution.[377.4] Congress, however, rejected such limitations upon state power.(p.378)
[Currently at pages 371-377 (Majority opinion).
Proceed to page 378 (Majority opinion cont.).
Proceed to pages 379-385 (Majority opinion cont., dissenting and concurring opinions).]
[374.1] No force or validity is added to petitioner's argument by the invocation of the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whatever the applicability of the Fifth Amendment, it is in no way expanded by those two provisions. Cf. Twining v. New Jersey, supra, at 99: "[T]he exemption from compulsory self-incrimination is not a privilege or immunity of National citizenship ...."
[376.2] In 1833 Mr. Chief Justice Marshall had this to say:
"Had the framers of these amendments intended them to be limitations on the powers of the state governments, they would have imitated the framers of the original constitution, and have expressed that intention. Had congress engaged in the extraordinary occupation of improving the constitutions of the several states by affording the people additional protection from the exercise of power by their own governments in matters which concerned themselves alone, they would have declared this purpose in plain and intelligible language.
"But it is universally understood, it is a part of the history of the day, that the great revolution which established the constitution of the United States, was not effected without immense opposition. Serious fears were extensively entertained that those powers which the patriot statesmen, who then watched over the interests of our country, deemed essential to union, and to the attainment of those invaluable objects for which union was sought, might be exercised in a manner dangerous to liberty. In almost every convention by which the constitution was adopted, amendments to guard against the abuse of power were recommended. These amendments demanded security against the apprehended encroachments of the general government--not against those of the local governments." Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 250.
[377.3] Letter to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 17, 1788, 14 Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Boyd ed. 1958) 16, 18. Madison went on to give the following additional reasons for his view: "2. Because there is great reason to fear that a positive declaration of some of the most essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude. I am sure that the rights of conscience in particular, if submitted to public definition would be narrowed much more than they are likely ever to be by an assumed power.... 3. Because the limited powers of the federal Government and the jealousy of the subordinate Governments, afford a security which has not existed in the case of the State Governments, and exists in no other. 4. Because experience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights on those occasions when its control is most needed." 14 id., at 18-19. The entire, rather long, letter merits reading. For an account of Madison's management of the resolution that became the Bill of Rights, see Brant, James Madison: Father of the Constitution, 1787-1800, c. 21.
[377.4] "Mr. Madison conceived this to be the most valuable amendment in the whole list. If there were any reason to restrain the Government of the United States from infringing upon these essential rights, it was equally necessary that they should be secured against the State Governments. He thought that if they provided against the one, it was as necessary to provide against the other, and was satisfied that it would be equally grateful to the people." 1 Annals of Cong. 755 (1789).