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[Cite as Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). NOTE: This decision concerns self-incrimination in a state court and whether the Fourteenth Amendment made the Fifth Amendment enforceable against State infringement. Citing Pressor concerning the right to arms, the Majority opinion referred to trial by jury, grand jury indictment, right to confront witnesses, and right to arms protections in the same individual rights context when it noted, "The right of trial by jury in civil cases, guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment ... and the right to bear arms, guaranteed by the Second Amendment ... [are] not ... guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against abrigment by the States, ... the same decision was made in respect of ... the Fifth Amendment ... Sixth Amendment." (P. 98) Concerning these rights the Court continued, "the Fourteenth Amendment did not forbid the States to abridge the personal rights enumerated in the first eight Amendments" "it is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state action." (P. 99) In his dissenting opinion Justice Harlan similarly referred to the bill of rights as protecting individual rights: "[founders protested new constitution] was defective, in that it furnished no express guaranty against the violation by the National Government of the personal rights that inhered in liberty." "[Founders were unanimous] as to necessity and wisdom of having a National Bill of Rights which would, beyond all question, secure against Federal encroachment all the rights, privileges and immunities which, everywhere and by everybody in America, were then recognized as fundamental in Anglo-American liberty." "the Amendments introduced no principle not already familiar to liberty-loving people." (P. 120-121) Unqualified reference to all the rights as individual rights is similar to the Court's comments eighty years later in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).]
[Twining v. New Jersey continued
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Currently at pages 100-113 (Majority opinion cont.).
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[paragraph continued from previous page] phrases of the law are so elusive of exact apprehension as this. Doubtless the difficulties of ascertaining its connotation have been increased in American jurisprudence, where it has been embodied in constitutions and put to new uses as a limit on legislative power. This court has always declined to give a comprehensive definition of it, and has preferred that its full meaning should be gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise. There are certain general principles, well settled, however, which narrow the field of discussion and may serve as helps to correct conclusions. These principles grow out of the proposition universally accepted by American courts on the authority of Coke, that the words "due process of law" are equivalent in meaning to the words "law of the land," contained in that chapter of Magna Charta, which provides that "no freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or any wise destroyed; nor shall we go upon him, nor send upon him, but by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." Murray v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How. 272; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97; Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 329; Cooley, Const. Lim. (7th ed.) 500; McGehee, Due Process of Law, 16. From the consideration of the meaning of the words in the light of their historical origin this court has drawn the following conclusions:
First. What is due process of law may be ascertained by an examination of those settled usages and modes of proceedings existing in the common and statute law of England before the emigration of our ancestors, and shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country. This test was adopted by the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Curtis, in Murray v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How. 272, 280 (approved in Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 320; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 390; but see Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U.S. 81, 85). Of course, the part of the Constitution then (p.101)before the court was the Fifth Amendment. If any different meaning of the same words, as they are used in the Fourteenth Amendment, can be conceived, none has yet appeared in judicial decision. "A process of law," said Mr. Justice Matthews, commenting on this statement of Mr. Justice Curtis, "which is not otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be due process of law, if it can show the sanction of settled usage both in England and in this country." Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528.
Second. It does not follow, however, that a procedure settled in English law at the time of the emigration, and brought to this country and practised by our ancestors, is an essential element of due process of law. If that were so, the procedure of the first half of the seventeenth century would be fastened upon the American jurisprudence like a straight-jacket, only to be unloosed by constitutional amendment. That, said Mr. Justice Matthews, in the same case, p. 529, "would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of progress or improvement." Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 388; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175.
Third. But, consistently with the requirements of due process, no change in ancient procedure can be made which disregards those fundamental principles, to be ascertained from time to time by judicial action, which have relation to process of law, and protect the citizen in his private right, and guard him against the arbitrary action of government. This idea has been many times expressed in differing words by this court, and it seems well to cite some expressions of it. The words due process of law "were intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice." Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wh. 235, 244 (approved in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527; Leeper v. Texas, 139 U.S. 462, 468; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 45). "This court has never attempted to define (p.102)with precision the words 'due process of law.' ... It is sufficient to say that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may disregard." Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389. "The same words refer to that law of the land in each State, which derives its authority from the inherent and reserved powers of the State, exerted within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions." In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448. "The limit of the full control which the State has in the proceedings of its courts, both in civil and criminal cases, is subject only to the qualification that such procedure must not work a denial of fundamental rights or conflict with specific and applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution." West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 263.
The question under consideration may first be tested by the application of these settled doctrines of this court. If the statement of Mr. Justice Curtis, as elucidated in Hurtado v. California, is to be taken literally, that alone might almost be decisive. For nothing is more certain, in point of historical fact, than that the practice of compulsory self-incrimination in the courts and elsewhere existed for four hundred years after the granting of Magna Charta, continued throughout the reign of Charles I (though then beginning to be seriously questioned), gained at least some foothold among the early colonists of this country, and was not entirely omitted at trials in England until the eighteenth century. Wigmore, Ev. § 2250 (see for the Colonies, note 108); Hallam's Constitutional History of England, chapter VIII, 2 Widdleton's American ed., 37 (describing the criminal jurisdiction of the court of Star Chamber); Bentham's Rationale of Judicial Evidence, book IX, chap. III, sect; IV.
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, in his studies of the reports of English trials for crime, has thrown much light on the existence of the practice of questioning persons accused of (p.103)crime, and its gradual decay. He considers, first, a group of trials which occurred between 1554 and 1637. Speaking of the trial before the jury, he says:
"The prisoner, in nearly every instance, asked, as a favor, that he might not be overpowered by the eloquence of counsel denouncing him in a set speech, but, in consideration of the weakness of his memory, might be allowed to answer separately to the different matters which might be alleged against him. This was usually granted, and the result was that the trial became a series of excited altercations between the prisoner and the different counsel opposed to him. Every statement of counsel operated as a question to the prisoner, and indeed they were constantly thrown into the form of questions, the prisoner either admitting or denying or explaining what was alleged against him. The result was that, during the period in question, the examination of the prisoner, which is at present scrupulously and I think even pedantically avoided, was the very essence of the trial, and his answers regulated the production of the evidence; the whole trial, in fact, was a long argument between the prisoner and counsel for the Crown, in which they questioned each other and grappled with each other's arguments with the utmost eagerness and closeness of reasoning." Stephen, 1 Hist. of the Crim. Law, 325.
This description of the questioning of the accused and the meeting of contending arguments finds curious confirmation in the report of the trial, in 1637, of Ann Hutchinson (which resulted in banishment), for holding and encouraging certain theological views which were not approved by the majority of the early Massachusetts rulers. 1 Hart's American History Told by Contemporaries, 382. The trial was presided over and the examination very largely conducted by Governor Winthrop, who had been for some years before his emigration an active lawyer and admitted to the Inner Temple. An examination of the report of this trial will show that he was not aware of any privilege against self-incrimination or conscious of (p.104)any duty to respect it. Stephen says of the trials between 1640 and 1660 (Ib., 358): "In some cases the prisoner was questioned, but never to any greater extent than that which it is practically impossible to avoid when a man has to defend himself without counsel. When so questioned the prisoners usually refused to answer." He further says (Ib., 440): "Soon after the Revolution of 1688 the practice of questioning the prisoner died out." But committing magistrates were authorized to take the examination of persons suspected, which if not under oath, was admissible against him on his trial, until by the 11 & 12 Vict., ch. 2, the prisoner was given the option whether he would speak, and warned that what he said might be used against him. But even now there seems to be a very well-recognized and important exception in English law to the rule that no person can be compelled to furnish evidence against himself. A practice in bankruptcy has existed from ancient times, and still exists, which would not be constitutionally possible under our national bankruptcy law or under the insolvency law of any state whose Constitution contains the customary prohibition of compulsory self-incrimination. The Bankruptcy Act of 1 James I, ch. 15, § 7 (1603), authorized the commissioners of bankruptcy to compel, by commitment if necessary, the bankrupt to submit to an examination touching his estate and dealings. The provision was continued in the subsequent acts, and in 1820, in Ex parte Cossens, Buck, Bkcy. Cases, 531, 540, Lord Eldon, in the course of a discussion of the right to examine a bankrupt, held that he could be compelled to disclose his violations of law in respect of his trade and estate, and, while recognizing the general principle of English law, that no one could be compelled to incriminate himself, said: "I have always understood the proposition to admit of a qualification with respect to the jurisdiction in bankruptcy." The act of 6 Geo. IV., ch. 16, § 36 (1825), authorized the compulsory examination of the bankrupt "touching all matters relating either to his trade, dealings, or estate, or which may tend to disclose any (p.105)secret grant, conveyance or concealment of his lands." The act of 12 & 13 Vict., ch. 106, § 117 (1849), contained the same provision. Construing these acts, it was held that the bankrupt must answer, though his answer might furnish evidence of his crime, and even if an indictment were pending against him, and that the evidence thus compelled was admissible on his trial for crime. Re Heath, 2 D. & Ch. 214; Re Smith, 2 D. & Ch. 230, 235; Reg. v. Scott, Dearsley & Bell, 47; Reg. v. Cross, 7 Cox, C. C. 226; Reg. v. Widdop, L. R. 2 C. C. R. 3. The act of 46 & 47 Vict., ch. 52, § 17 (1883), which we understand to be (with some amendment not material here) the present law, passed after the decisions cited, expressly provided that the examination shall be taken in writing and signed by the debtor, "and may thereafter be used in evidence against him." It has since been held that other evidence of his testimony than that written and signed by him may be used. Reg. v. Erdheim (1896), 2 Q. B. D. 260, and see Rex v. Pike (1902), 1 K. B. 552.[105.1] It is to be observed that not until 1883 did Parliament, which has an unlimited legislative power, expressly provide that the evidence compelled from the bankrupt could be used in proof of an indictment against him. The rule had been previously firmly established by judicial decisions upon statutes simply authorizing a compulsory examination. If the rule had been thought to be in conflict with "the law of the land" of Magna Charta, "a sacred text, the nearest approach to an irrepealable, 'fundamental statute' that England has ever had," 1 Pollock & Maitland, 152, it is inconceivable that such a consideration would not have received some attention from counsel and judges. We think it is manifest, from this review of the origin, growth, extent and limits of the exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in the English law, that it is not regarded as a part of the law of the land of Magna Charta or the due process of law, which (p.106)has been deemed an equivalent expression, but, on the contrary, is regarded as separate from and independent of due process. It came into existence not as an essential part of due process, but as a wise and beneficent rule of evidence developed in the course of judicial decision. This is a potent argument when it is remembered that the phrase was borrowed from English law and that to that law we must look at least for its primary meaning.
But without repudiating or questioning the test proposed by Mr. Justice Curtis for the court, or rejecting the inference drawn from English law, we prefer to rest our decision on broader grounds, and inquire whether the exemption from self-incrimination is of such a nature that it must be included in the conception of due process. Is it a fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of free government and is the inalienable right of a citizen of such a government? If it is, and if it is of a nature that pertains to process of law, this court has declared it to be essential to due process of law. In approaching such a question it must not be forgotten that in a free representative government nothing is more fundamental than the right of the people through their appointed servants to govern themselves in accordance with their own will, except so far as they have restrained themselves by constitutional limits specifically established, and that in our peculiar dual form of government nothing is more fundamental than the full power of the State to order its own affairs and govern its own people, except so far as the Federal Constitution expressly or by fair implication has withdrawn that power. The power of the people of the States to make and alter their laws at pleasure is the greatest security for liberty and justice, this court has said in Hurtado v. California, supra. We are not invested with the jurisdiction to pass upon the expediency, wisdom or justice of the laws of the States as declared by their courts, but only to determine their conformity with the Federal Constitution and the paramount laws enacted pursuant to it. Under the guise of interpreting the Constitution we must (p.107)take care that we do not import into the discussion our own personal views of what would be wise, just and fitting rules of government to be adopted by a free people and confound them with constitutional limitations. The question before us is the meaning of a constitutional provision which forbids the States to deny to any person due process of law. In the decision of this question we have the authority to take into account only those fundamental rights which are expressed in that provision, not the rights fundamental in citizenship, state or National, for they are secured otherwise, but the rights fundamental in due process, and therefore an essential part of it. We have to consider whether the right is so fundamental in due process that a refusal of the right is a denial of due process. One aid to the solution of the question is to inquire how the right was rated during the time when the meaning of due process was in a formative state and before it was incorporated in American constitutional law. Did those who then were formulating and insisting upon the rights of the people entertain the view that the right was so fundamental that there could be no due process without it? It has already appeared that, prior to the formation of the American Constitutions, in which the exemption from compulsory self-incrimination was specifically secured, separately, independently, and side by side with the requirement of due process, the doctrine was formed, as other doctrines of the law of evidence have been formed, by the course of decision in the courts covering a long period of time. Searching further, we find nothing to show that it was then thought to be other than a just and useful principle of law. None of the great instruments in which we are accustomed to look for the declaration of the fundamental rights made reference to it. The privilege was not dreamed of for hundreds of years after Magna Charta (1215), and could not have been implied in the "law of the land" there secured. The Petition of Right (1629), though it insists upon the right secured by Magna Charta to be condemned only by the law of the land, and sets forth by way of grievance divers violations of (p.108)it, is silent upon the practice of compulsory self-incrimination, though it was then a matter of common occurrence in all the courts of the realm. The Bill of Rights of the first year of the reign of William and Mary (1689) is likewise silent, though the practice of questioning the prisoner at his trial had not then ceased. The negative argument which arises out of the omission of all reference to any exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in these three great declarations of English liberty (though it is not supposed to amount to a demonstration) is supported by the positive argument that the English courts and Parliaments, as we have seen, have dealt with the exemption as they would have dealt with any other rule of evidence, apparently without a thought that the question was affected by the law of the land of Magna Charta, or the due process of law which is its equivalent.
We pass by the meager records of the early colonial time, so far as they have come to our attention, as affording light too uncertain for guidance. See Wigmore, § 2250, note 108; 2 Hennings St. at Large 422 (Va., 1677); 1 Winthrop's History of New England, 47, Provincial Act, 4 W. & M. Ancient Charters, Massachusetts, 214. Though it is worthy of note that neither the declaration of rights of the Stamp Act Congress (1765) nor the declaration of rights of the Continental Congress (1774) nor the ordinance for the government of the Northwestern Territory included the privilege in their enumeration of fundamental rights.
But the history of the incorporation of the privilege in an amendment to the National Constitution is full of significance in this connection. Five States, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia and Connecticut, ratified the Constitution without proposing Amendments. Massachusetts then followed with a ratification, accompanied by a recommendation of nine amendments, none of which referred to the privilege; Maryland with a ratification without proposing amendments; South Carolina with a ratification accompanied by a recommendation of four amendments, none of which referred to the privilege, (p.109)and New Hampshire with a ratification accompanied by a recommendation of twelve amendments, none of which referred to the privilege. The nine States requisite to put the Constitution in operation ratified it without a suggestion of incorporating this privilege. Virginia was the tenth State to ratify, proposing, by separate resolution, an elaborate bill of rights under twenty heads, and in addition twenty amendments to the body of the Constitution. Among the rights enumerated as "essential and inalienable" is that no man "can be compelled to give evidence against himself," and "no freeman ought to be deprived of his life, liberty or property but by the law of the land." New York ratified with a proposal of numerous amendments and a declaration of rights which the convention declared could not be violated and were consistent with the Constitution. One of these rights was that "no person ought to be taken, imprisoned or deprived of his freehold, or be exiled or deprived of his privileges, franchises, life, liberty or property but by due process of law;" and another was that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused ... should not be compelled to give evidence against himself." North Carolina and Rhode Island were the last to ratify, each proposing a large number of amendments, including the provision that no man "can be compelled to give evidence against himself;" and North Carolina, that "no freeman ought to be ... deprived of his life, liberty or property but by the law of the land;" and Rhode Island, that "no freeman ought to be ... deprived of his life, liberty or property but by the trial by jury, or by the law of the land."
Thus it appears that four only of the thirteen original States insisted upon incorporating the privilege in the Constitution, and they separately and simultaneously with the requirement of due process of law, and that three States proposing amendments were silent upon this subject. It is worthy of note that two of these four States did not incorporate the privilege in their own constitutions, where it would have had a much wider field of usefulness, until many years after. New York (p.110)in 1821 and Rhode Island in 1842 (its first Constitution). This survey does not tend to show that it was then in this country the universal or even general belief that the privilege ranked among the fundamental and inalienable rights of mankind; and what is more important here, it affirmatively shows that the privilege was not conceived to be inherent in due process of law, but on the other hand a right separate, independent and outside of due process. Congress, in submitting the Amendments to the several states, treated the two rights as exclusive of each other. Such also has been the view of the States in framing their own Constitutions, for in every case, except in New Jersey and Iowa, where the due process clause or its equivalent is included, it has been thought necessary to include separately the privilege clause. Nor have we been referred to any decision of a State court save one (State v. Height, 117 Iowa, 650), where the exemption has been held to be required by due process of law. The inference is irresistible that it has been the opinion of constitution makers that the privilege, if fundamental in any sense, is not fundamental in due process of law, nor an essential part of it. We believe that this opinion is proved to have been correct by every historical test by which the meaning of the phrase can be tried.
The decisions of this court, though they are silent on the precise question before us, ought to be searched to discover if they present any analogies which are helpful in its decision. The essential elements of due process of law, already established by them, are singularly few, though of wide application and deep significance. We are not here concerned with the effect of due process in restraining substantive laws, as, for example, that which forbids the taking of private property for public use without compensation. We need notice now only those cases which deal with the principles which must be observed in the trial of criminal and civil causes. Due process requires that the court which assumes to determine the rights of parties shall have jurisdiction (Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34; Old Wayne Life Association (p.111)v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8), and that there shall be notice and opportunity for hearing given the parties. (Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409; Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398; and see Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373). Subject to these two fundamental conditions, which seem to be universally prescribed in all systems of law established by civilized countries, this court has up to this time sustained all state laws, statutory or judicially declared, regulating procedure, evidence and methods of trial, and held them to be consistent with due process of law. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90; Re Converse, 137 U.S. 624; Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U.S. 692; Leeper v. Texas, 139 U.S. 462; Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314; McNulty v. California, 149 U.S. 645; McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684; Iowa Central v. Iowa, 160 U.S. 389; Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U.S. 81; Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138; Hodgson v. Vermont, 168 U.S. 262; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172; Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581; Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427; West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258; Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212; Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425; Howard v. Kentucky, 200 U.S. 164; Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638; Felts v. Murphy, 201 U.S. 123.
Among the most notable of these decisions are those sustaining the denial of jury trial both in civil and criminal cases, the substitution of informations for indictments by a grand jury, the enactment that the possession of policy slips raises a presumption of illegality, and the admission of the deposition of an absent witness in a criminal case. The cases proceed upon the theory that, given a court of justice which has jurisdiction and acts, not arbitrarily but in conformity with a general law, upon evidence, and after inquiry made with notice to the parties affected and opportunity to be heard, then all the requirements of due process, so far as it relates to procedure in court and methods of trial and character and effect of evidence, are complied with. Thus it was said in Iowa Central v. Iowa, 160 U.S. 393: "But it is clear that the Fourteenth Amendment in no way undertakes to control the (p.112)power of a State to determine by what process legal rights may be asserted or legal obligations be enforced, provided the method of procedure adopted gives reasonable notice and accords fair opportunity to be heard before the issues are decided;" and in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236: "It is no longer open to contention that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States does not control mere forms of procedure in state courts or regulate practice therein. All its requirements are complied with, provided in the proceedings which are claimed not to have been due process of law the person condemned has had sufficient notice, and adequate opportunity has been afforded him to defend;" and in Hooker v. Los Angeles, 188 U.S. 314, 318: "The Fourteenth Amendment does not control the power of a State to determine the form of procedure by which legal rights may be ascertained, if the method adopted gives reasonable notice and affords a fair opportunity to be heard;" and in Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 435: "Due process of law, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, does not require the State to adopt a particular form of procedure, so long as it appears that the accused has had sufficient notice of the accusation and an adequate opportunity to defend himself in the prosecution." It is impossible to reconcile the reasoning of these cases and the rule which governed their decision with the theory that an exemption from compulsory self-incrimination is included in the conception of due process of law. Indeed the reasoning for including indictment by a grand jury and trial by a petit jury in that conception, which has been rejected by this court in Hurtado v. California and Maxwell v. Dow, was historically and in principle much stronger. Clearly appreciating this, Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissent in each of these cases, pointed out that the inexorable logic of the reasoning of the court was to allow the States, so far as the Federal Constitution was concerned, to compel any person to be a witness against himself. In Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking (p.113)for the whole court, said, in effect, that the Fourteenth Amendment would not prevent a State from adopting or continuing the Civil Law instead of the common law. This dictum has been approved and made an essential part of the reasoning of the decision in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 387, 389, and Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 598. The statement excludes the possibility that the privilege is essential to due process, for it hardly need be said that the interrogation of the accused at his trial is the practice in the civil law.
Even if the historical meaning of due process of law and the decisions of this court did not exclude the privilege from it, it would be going far to rate it as an immutable principle of justice which is the inalienable possession of every citizen of a free government. Salutary as the principle may seem to the great majority, it cannot be ranked with the right to hearing before condemnation, the immunity from arbitrary power not acting by general laws, and the inviolability of private property. The wisdom of the exemption has never been universally assented to since the days of Bentham; many doubt it to-day, and it is best defended not as an unchangeable principle of universal justice but as a law proved by experience to be expedient. See Wigmore, § 2251. It has no place in the jurisprudence of civilized and free countries outside the domain of the common law, and it is nowhere observed among our own people in the search for truth outside the administration of the law. It should, must and will be rigidly observed where it is secured by specific constitutional safeguards, but there is nothing in it which gives it a sanctity above and before constitutions themselves. Much might be said in favor of the view that the privilege was guaranteed against state impairment as a privilege and immunity of National citizenship, but, as has been shown, the decisions of this court have foreclosed that view. There seems to be no reason whatever, however, for straining the meaning of due process of law to include this privilege within it, because, perhaps, we may think it of great value. The states had guarded the privilege [paragraph continues next page]
[Return to pages 78-97 (Majority opinion).
Return to pages 98-99 (Majority opinion cont.).
Currently at pages 100-113 (Majority opinion cont.).
Proceed to pages 114-127 (Harlan dissent).]
[105.1] In certain offenses, which may be generally described as embezzlements, the evidence compelled from a bankrupt cannot be used against him. 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 96, § 85; 53 & 54 Vict., ch. 71, § 27.